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How RANDOM AND SUSPICIONLESS MAY SCHOOL 
SEARCHES BE?: DOVBTINGJOYV. PENN-HARRIS-
MADISON SCHOOL CORPORATION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
School districts' responses to the problems posed by student 
drug use place difficulties and limitations on the ability of 
individual schools to educate children. 1 Recently, random 
suspicionless drug testing of students who participate in 
specific activities has gained popularity. This drug testing 
procedure has raised concerns about the potential for violation 
of students' Fourth Amendment rights. 2 Such concerns 
justifiably stem from the expansion of schools' abilities to 
violate student privacy rights. 
The legal disputes in this area never harp upon whether a 
student may be searched or drug tested by the school, or if the 
school has probable cause based upon individual suspicion, or if 
the school has obtained a warrant. The cases that follow simi-
larly do not argue the permissibility of schools' drug testing 
students based on individualized suspicion alone. Rather, the 
issue presented in these cases is whether students may be clas-
sified for the purpose of drug testing by the types of activities 
they participate in at school, without either suspicion of indi-
vidual illegal conduct or probable cause. In other words, is it 
permissible for schools to test students for drug use based 
solely upon the fact that they participate in extra-curricular ac-
tivities? 
1. Charles J. Russo & David L. Gregory, Legal and Ethical Issues Surrounding 
Drug Testing in Schools, 1999 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C. L. 611 (citing studies done 
about levels of drug use). 
2. The Fourth Amendment states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. 
CaNST. amend IV. 
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In the recent case of Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison School 
Corporation, 3 the Seventh Circuit dealt with the issue of 
whether or not the Supreme Court's tests espoused in New Jer-
sey v. T.L.0. 4 and Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton5 were 
properly used in the school's decision to use random suspi-
cionless drug testing of student drivers and others who partici-
pated in non-athletic extra-curricular activities. 
In Joy, the Seventh Circuit reviewed an appeal by sev-
eral students who sued their school district for due process vio-
lations. The school had enacted a random drug, alcohol, and 
nicotine testing policy for all students who participated in ex-
tracurricular activities, drove to school, volunteered to be part 
of the random pool, were suspended from the school for three 
consecutive days before they could come back to classes, and all 
students for whom there was a reasonable suspicion of being 
under the influence of drugs and alcohol. Joy and the other 
plaintiffs attacked the merits of the first two grounds: students 
who participate in non-athletic extra-curricular activities and 
students who drive to school. 
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Joy was particularly no-
table in that it departed from established policy. The court up-
held the school's suspicionless drug testing policy even though 
the school district failed to meet the test laid out by the Su-
preme Court, it had a poorly outlined policy, and its counsel 
admitted that his goal was to require all high-school students 
to undergo suspicionless drug testing. Had it not been for 
precedent set by the Seventh Circuit's previous decision in 
Todd v. Rush County Schools,6 the panel stated it would have 
invalidated the school district's policy because it violated stu-
dents' Fourth Amendment rights. 7 
This paper will explore the questions surrounding the Joy 
decision and examine the background and analytical frame-
work that made the decision in upholding random suspicionless 
drug testing possible. To accomplish this task, this paper will 
analyze precedent set by the Supreme Court's and the Seventh 
Circuit's legal decisions and show how they have consistently 
held that students' rights under the Fourth Amendment are 
3. 212 F.3d 1052 (7'" Cir. 2000). 
4. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
5. 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
6. 133 F.3d 984 (7'" Cir. 1998). 
7. See Joy, 212 F.3d at 1066. 
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limited. This paper will then examine some of the underlying 
policy considerations behind these decisions, namely the im-
pact of random drug testing upon the value of extra-curricular 
activities, the effects of these decisions upon the police powers 
of school districts, and whether the justification of protecting 
student health and welfare is sufficient for intruding upon stu-
dent privacy. Finally, this paper will examine how a school dis-
trict would properly implement a constitutional suspicionless, 
random drug-testing program. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Joy relied primarily upon two Supreme Court cases, New 
Jersey v. T.L.O. 8 and Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 9 as 
well as two previous Seventh Circuit cases for its decision. 
Since Joy relied upon these cases in its determination to up-
hold the school's drug testing policy, it is useful to review the 
tests proffered by the Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit 
in determining whether a school district has appropriately ap-
plied the Fourth Amendment to its student drug-testing poli-
cies. 
A. Supreme Court Cases Dealing with the Fourth Amendment 
Rights of Public School Students 
1. New Jersey v. T.L.O. 
The first case dealing with the rights of school districts to 
search students for drugs came in the 1985 case, New Jersey v. 
T.£.0. 10 This case arose when a female student who had been 
caught smoking in a bathroom had her purse searched by the 
assistant principal after she flatly denied smoking. The assis-
tant principal found not only a pack of cigarettes, but also roll-
ing papers, a small amount of marijuana, a pipe, several empty 
plastic bags, cash, a list of students who owed her money for 
marijuana, and two letters implicating her in drug dealing. Af-
ter the police and her mother were called, the student, T.L.O., 
admitted to having dealt drugs. 11 
8. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
9. 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
10. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
11. See id. 
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The Supreme Court had to decide whether "the exclusion-
ary rule should operate to bar consideration in juvenile delin-
quency proceedings of evidence unlawfully seized by a school 
official without the involvement of law enforcement officers."12 
The majority's decision held that for the purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment, the assistant principal conducted a reasonable 
search. The majority reached this conclusion based upon a bal-
ancing test between the school's interest in a drug-free learning 
environment and the student's interest in privacy. 13 The Court 
emphasized that in certain cases a search may be conducted 
without a warrant and that probable cause was not the only 
standard for an official of the state to conduct a search. 14 The 
majority even acknowledged that although the Fourth 
Amendment applies as a restraint of governmental intrusion 
upon students' rights, a "special needs" exception exists when it 
is determined that individual suspicion and probable cause are 
impracticable. 15 The Court further explained that since the 
government has an obligation to fulfill the purposes of educa-
tion, 16 the need to instill discipline among the students is more 
pressing than ever. Widespread drug use has made it much 
more difficult for school districts to discipline their students. 17 
Hence, the "special needs" exception requires schools to have 
the ability to use reasonable flexibility in determining when it 
is appropriate to search students under the Fourth Amend-
ment. 
18 On one side of the equation, schools find it necessary to 
exercise their police power in maintaining stability and order, 
12. Id. at 331. 
13. ld. at 343. 
14. See id. at 337. The court dictated the rule: "on one side of the balance are ar-
rayed the individual's legitimate expectation of privacy and personal security; on the 
other, the government's need for effective methods to deal with breaches of public or-
der." ld. 
15. See id. 
16. !d. at 334. The Court stated "[t]hat they are educating the young for citizen-
ship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if 
we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount impor-
tant principles of our government as mere platitudes." !d. 
17. ld. at 340 (" ... maintaining security and order in the schools requires a cer-
tain degree of flexibility in school disciplinary procedures, and we have respected the 
value of preserving the informality of the student-teacher relationship."). 
18. See id. "It is evident that the school setting requires some easing of the re-
strictions to which searches by public authorities are ordinarily subject." As such, the 
court is hesitant to create rules which would, "unduly interfere with the maintenance 
of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools." 
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whereas on the other side of the equation, students expect to 
maintain their privacy. The Court held that the Fourth 
Amendment did not protect a person's unreasonable or ille-
gitimate expectations of privacy. The test balances the govern-
mental and privacy interests in cases where the practicality of 
the warrant and probable cause requirements are in the par-
ticular context. 
The Court rejected two of New Jersey's arguments: first, 
that a student in public schools was more akin to a prisoner 
and second, that he or she had no need to bring personal be-
longings to school. It did, however, hold that the reasonable ex-
pectation of student privacy was diminished in the public 
school setting. The rule in T.L.O. was that school officials could 
justify a search of a student upon reasonable and individual-
ized suspicion "that the search [would] turn up evidence that 
the student has violated or is violating either the law or the 
rules of the school."19 
Justice Stevens' vigorous dissent stated that students in a 
governmental institution deserved more than a reasonableness 
test to determine whether they could be searched for violation 
of school rules. 20 Unlike the majority, Stevens did not distin-
guish between students in public schools and the general public 
at large. Stevens argued that, despite whatever test the major-
ity proposed, "[t]he search of a young woman's purse by a 
school administrator is a serious invasion of her legitimate ex-
pectations of privacy."21 He stated, "[m]oved by whatever mo-
mentary evil has aroused their fears, officials - perhaps even 
supported by a majority of citizens - may be tempted to con-
duct searches that sacrifice the liberty of each citizen to as-
suage the perceived evil. But the Fourth Amendment rests on 
the principle that a true balance between the individual and 
society depends on the recognition of 'the right to be let 
alone ... "'2 
Stevens felt that the problem with the majority's balancing 
test was that the difficulties experienced in securing a warrant 
"[are] not an unintended result of the Fourth Amendment's 
19. ld. at 342. 
20. See id. at 354. The sanction of "school officials to conduct full-scale searches 
on a 'reasonableness' standard whose only definite content is that it is not the same 
test as the 'probable cause' standard found in the text of the Fourth Amendment." I d. 
21. ld. at 375. 
22. ld. at 361-62 (footnote omitted). 
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protection of privacy; rather, [they are] the ver;y purpose for 
which the Amendment was thought necessary."2" Stevens fur-
ther contended that the use of a balancing test in determining 
the limits of Fourth Amendment rights "finds support neither 
in precedent nor policy and portends a dangerous weakening of 
the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to protect the privacy 
and security of our citizens."24 He expostulated that the major-
ity's balancing test was essentially a form of cost-benefit analy-
sis not contemplated by the Constitution. 2fi Thus, he felt the 
majority overstated the social costs faced by the government 
while under-weighing the need for Fourth Amendment protec-
2c tion by students. ' Stevens finally concluded that the probable 
27 
cause standard should be upheld even for students. 
2. Vernonia: U.S. Supreme Court Precedent 
Vernonia continued where T.L.O. left off by applying "spe-
cial needs" testing to the area of random drug testing of stu-
dent athletes. The Vernonia school district was at a loss as to 
what to do regarding an entrenched drug problem led by the 
student athletes. School district officials anecdotally had no-
ticed that the number of students using drugs had risen sig-
nificantly, that discipline had become worse, and that profane 
language had become common during the 1980s. After a series 
of injuries involving athletes suspected of drug use, the district 
decided to actively respond to the problem through "special 
classes, speakers, and presentations designed to deter drug 
use."
28 When this initial program failed, the district, after pres-
entations to the parents, implemented a "Student Athlete Drug 
Policy." This policy, which involved drug testing student ath-
letes only, had the express purpose of "prevent[ing] student 
23. !d. at 357. 
24. !d. at 358. 
25. See id. at 362-69 (wherein Justice Stevens extensively discusses the flexibil-
ity, in terms of"costs," etc., for which this rule provides). 
26. !d. at 362. 
27. See id at 361 
"Considerations of the deepest significance for the freedom of our citi-
zens counsel strict adherence to the principle that no search may be 
conducted where the official is not in possession of probable cause -
that is, where the official does not know of 'facts and circumstances 
[thatl warrant a prudent man in believing that the offense has been 
committed."' (quoting Henry v. United States, 361 U.S., at 102 (1959)). 
28. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 649. 
343] SUSPICIONLESS SCHOOL SEARCHES 349 
athletes from using drugs, to protect their health and safety, 
and to provide drug users with assistance programs."29 
All students wishing to participate on any athletic team 
were required to have their parents sign a consent form per-
mitting drug testing. The policy mandated drug testing of all 
athletes at the beginning of the season. The students' names 
were subsequently placed into a pool from which a student, 
with two adults, would draw the names of ten percent of the 
athletes, who would be drug tested that day. The tests were 
administered in the locker rooms and students were searched 
specifically for controlled substances. If a student tested posi-
tive, a second test was taken; if the second test were negative, 
then no further action would be taken. However, if the test was 
again positive, the athletes' parents would be notified and the 
student would be given the choice of participating in a six-week 
drug assistance program or being suspended for the remainder 
of the season. A second offense would automatically suspend 
the student from playing sports for the rest of the season. A 
third offense would suspend the athlete from the rest of the 
present season and the next two athletic seasons.30 
The Court initially explained that the Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendments were enacted to protect the citizenry of the 
people from unreasonable searches and seizures/n which en-
compassed drug testing in schools.:12 The Court, however, quali-
fied this by stating that a person's Fourth Amendment rights 
are not absolute; rather, "the ultimate measure of the constitu-
tionality of a governmental search is 'reasonableness."'33 The 
Court acknowledged that judicial warrant and probable cause 
are generally required when the government conducts a search 
but that some instances warranted exception. The Court de-
termined, because of its holding in T.L. 0., that public schools 
fell into the category of "special needs" cases. Thus, under the 
"special needs" doctrine the government does not require a 
warrant to perform a search. Hence, the Court developed a bal-
ancing test where it engaged in "balancing ... between the in-
trusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests" and 
29. !d. at 650. 
30. See id. at 651. 
31. See id. at 652. 
32. See id. 
33. Id. at 652. 
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the search's promotion oflegitimate governmental interests.34 
Subsequently, the Supreme Court went on to enumerate a 
four-prong test as a guide in determining whether or not the 
government could reasonably conduct a search without a war-
rant. First, the Court said that the nature of the privacy inter-
est must be examined. The Court stated that since minors are 
in the custody of the school, they are limited in their privacy 
interests in general, and that athletes, in particular, have a 
limited privacy interest because "there is 'an element of com-
munal undress' inherent in athletic participation."35 Secondly, 
the court reasoned, the government must determine the char-
acter of the intrusion on the individual's privacy interest. Here, 
since the drug testing process was "nearly identical to condi-
tions encountered in public restrooms," the Court concluded 
that the impairment of student's privacy rights was reason-
able.36 This view was bolstered by the fact that the information 
was "not disclosed to law enforcement personnel and was pro-
vided to only a limited number of school personnel.":l7 The 
Court stated that the third prong was the nature of the gov-
ernmental concern at issue. As the Court in Vernonia pointed 
out: "deterring drug use by schoolchildren was obviously impor-
34. !d. at 653. See also Joy, 212 F.3d at 1058-59 (quoting Schaill by Kross v. Tip-
pecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1318 (1988)). 
35. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657. This characterization presents its own trou-
bling legal question: does the fact that a school provides only 'communal' changing fa-
cilities determine that the Fourth Amendment privacy protections have lost some of 
their meaning? What if schools paid for locker rooms with private or semi-private lock-
ers? Would those student athletes have the same problems as Vernonia? It seems that 
this justification is a weak one. One commentator has noted that this concept of a lower 
expectation of privacy for students participating in extracurricular activities is not uni-
versally accepted. 
Certainly there is no remarkable element of communal undress pre-
sent for participants in the Library Club or Future Farmers of Amer-
ica. The Court of Appeals comes distressingly close to authorizing 
blanket, random, suspicionless searches of all public school students 
based upon the lesser expectation of privacy held by students in gen-
eral. J. Nathan Jensen, Note, Don't Rush to Abandon a Suspicion-
Based Standard for Searches o{Public School Students, 2000 BYU L. 
REV. 695 (2000). 
36. Joy, 212 F.3d at 1059. It would seem that there is a difference between uri-
nating without anyone monitoring your behavior and the scrutiny that one's behavior 
is under during urinalysis. It appears again that the court is stretching. Although the 
situation is the same, the context is very different. Further, the courts do not consider 
a legal privacy interest in one's biological byproducts, perhaps because these cases fall 
under the "special needs" exception. 
37. !d. at 1059. 
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tant, especially given that school years are the time when the 
physical, psychological, and addictive effects of drugs are most 
severe."
38 The Court stated that drug use by students affects 
the whole student body because it disrupts the educational 
process.39 The Supreme Court noted that the lower courts re-
quired that the school district show a "compelling need" for the 
drug testing in order to eliminate the requirement of individu-
alized suspicion of students.40 This was met, however, because 
the government was able to show that its interest was "impor-
tant enough to justify the particular search at hand, in light of 
other factors that show the search to be relatively intrusive 
upon a genuine expectation of privacy."41 The Court stated the 
fourth prong was the immediacy of the concern. It concluded 
that "this program is directed more narrowly to drug use by 
school athletes, where the risk of immediate physical harm to 
the drug user or those with whom he is playing his sport is par-
ticularly high."42 The Vernonia court highlighted evidence 
showing that drug use negatively impacts student athletes in 
several ways, namely through "impairment of judgment, slow 
reaction time, and a lessening of the perception of pain." There 
were additionally physical risks of drugs to athletes, such as 
"'artificially induced heart rate increase . . . [b]lood pressure3 increase and [m]asking of the normal fatigue response."'4 
Based upon examination of these four prongs, the Court held 
that all the government needed was substantial reasonableness 
before it could randomly drug test student athletes without 
susp1c10n. 
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Stevens and Souter, 
did not agree with the majority's elaborate balancing test. In 
her dissent, she mused that "the millions ofthese students who 
participate in interscholastic sports, an overwhelming majority 
of whom have given school officials no reason whatsoever to 
suspect the_x use drugs at school, are open to an intrusive bod-
ily search." 4 
She argued that suspicionless drug testing was not justified 
38. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661. 
39. See Joy, 212 F.3d at 1060. 
40. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661. 
41. !d. (emphasis added). 
42. !d. at 662. 
43. ld. 
44. !d. at 667. 
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on the facts because it was not clear that a suspicion-based re-
gime would not work. She criticized the majority's reasonable-
ness test, stating that it "treats a suspicion-based regime as if 
it were just any run-of-the-mill, less intrusive alternative-that 
is, an alternative that officials may bypass if the lesser intru-
sion ... is outweighed by policy concerns unrelated to practica-
bility."45 She felt that reasonableness should mean reasonable 
suspicion, rather than some sort of balancing. This should be 
especially true since the Court never discussed whether a sus-
picion-based program is practical. The Fourth Amendment 
places a limitation, enacting a price on government's ability to 
monitor the behavior of its citizens even in situations involving 
a compelling government interest like fighting drugs, which is 
traditionally not part of a school's function. 46 
O'Connor went further, stating that the majority's decision 
effectively espoused a policy allowing for blanket searches of 
students. 47 She felt that the decision was fundamentally uncon-
stitutional because it could undermine the very nature of the 
Fourth Amendment. "Blanket searches, because they can in-
volve 'thousands or millions' of searches, 'pos[e] a greater 
threat to liberty' than do suspicion-based ones, which 'affec[tJ 
one person at a time."'48 Judges should not be in the business of 
determining what has, up until Vernonia, been "generally con-
sidered per se unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment."49 A reasonableness test violates the Framers' 
hard-fought battle to contain the ability of government to gen-
erally search its citizens, individuals as well as groups. 
O'Connor suggested, instead, an alternative procedure that 
would address the school district's need for a policy that com-
bats drugs and still maintains the individual suspicion re-
so quirement. She suggested that the school should focus drug-
45. /d. at 676. 
46. See id. at 680. 
47. /d. at 681. The instant case, however, asks whether the Fourth Amendment is 
even more lenient than that, i.e., whether it is so lenient that students may be deprived 
of the Fourth Amendment's only remaining, and most basic, categorical protection: its 
strong preference for an individualized suspicion requirement, with its accompanying 
antipathy toward personally intrusive, blanket searches of mostly innocent people. 
48. /d. at 667 (quoting Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 365 (1987)). 
49. /d. 
50. See id. Others disagree with this sentiment arguing that it would undermine 
the effectiveness of the school to deter drug use. These commentators fail to ask 
whether society wants to promote effectiveness; See also John J. Bursch, Note, The 4 
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testing on students who violate rules against severe disruption 
on and around campuses. This policy would accomplish two 
things: it would limit the number of students tested and would 
give students control, through their behavior, over the likeli-
51 hood that they would be tested. This ensures that only those 
who violate specific rules will be drug tested. 
O'Connor further challenged the majority's test itself by re-
futing its justification for implementing the test. She re-
marked, "certainly monitored urination combined with urine 
testing is more intrusive than some personal searches we have 
said trigger Fourth Amendment protections in the past."52 She 
additionally found the Court's reliance upon physical examina-
tions and vaccinations as poor justification for its holding be-
cause neither physical examinations nor vaccinations are 
searches under the Fourth Amendment. She stated, "[p]hysical 
exams (and of course vaccinations) are not searches for condi-
tions that reflect wrongdoing on the part of the student, and so 
are wholly nonaccusator:y and have no consequences that can 
be regarded as punitive.w'3 Additionally (and similar to T.L. 0. ), 
O'Connor pointed out that the majority overstated governmen-
tal concern of a suspicion-based program, commenting that the 
district seems to have understated the extent to which such a 
program is less intrusive of students' privacy."54 Finally, 
O'Connor echoed Steven's dissent in T.L.O. by concluding, "[i]t 
cannot be too often stated that the greatest threats to our con-
stitutional freedoms come in times of crisis."55 
B. Seventh Circuit Cases 
1. Athletes and Cheerleaders 
Before Vernonia was decided, the Seventh Circuit had al-
ready determined that school districts may randomly drug test 
R's of Drug Testing in Public School: Random Is Reasonable and Rights are Reduced, 
80 MINN. L. REV. 1221 (1996). 
51. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 685. 
52. Id. at 672 (See Cup v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973)). 
53. ld. at 683. 
54. !d. at 678. 
55. !d. at 686. "But we must also stay mindful that not all government responses 
to such times are hysterical overreactions; some crises are quite real, and when they 
are, they serve precisely as the compelling state interest that we have said may justify 
a measured intrusion on constitutional rights." ld. 
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student athletes and cheerleaders in Schaill v. Tippecanoe 
County School Corp. 56 In Schaill, the baseball coach had re-
ceived information that several of the players on the team were 
using drugs. He ordered that his team undergo drug testing 
and found that five of the sixteen players tested positive for 
marijuana use. 57 These results led the school board to "institute 
a random urine testing program for interscholastic athletes 
and cheerleaders in the TSC school system."58 The program re-
quired a signed consent form by both the student and one par-
ent. If the student made the team, each athlete was assigned a 
number that was placed in a box. At different times during the 
season, the administrator would select a number from the box 
59 
and the person chosen would be tested. The student was 
taken to the restroom, and was allowed to fill the cup without 
visual monitoring. Certain checks ensured that the sample was 
authentic. 60 
Litigation ensued when two students refused to participate 
in the schools' random urinalysis program, claiming that the 
test violated their Fourth Amendment due process rights. 61 The 
district court denied their claims for declaratory and injunctive 
relief. 62 
The circuit panel determined that urinalysis testing was a 
Fourth Amendment search and that a ~erson had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy when urinating. ·a The court determined 
that the school could not contract away a person's constitu-
tional rights that it could not command directly. 64 Thus, the 
56. 864 F.2d 1309 (7"' Cir. 1988). 
57. See id. 
58. Id. 
59. See id. at 1311. 
60. See id. If the student tested positive for drugs, they could have the remaining 
sample tested at the lab of their choice. Barring any innocent explanations, the school 
would suspend the student from participating in 30% of the varsity events for the re-
mainder of the season. A second positive result would keep the player from participat-
ing in 50% of the varsity events for a remainder of the season. A third positive result 
would suspend the student from playing varsity sports for a full calendar year, while a 
fourth one would eliminate the student from playing on any sport team while they 
were in high school. Id. 
61. See id. at 1310. 
62. See Schaill v. Tippecanoe County. Sch. Corp., 679 F. Supp. 833 (N.D. Ind. 
1988). 
63. Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1312. The court went on to say that society discusses such 
matters in only the most euphemistic forms, further indicating the general sense of 
privacy surrounding the act of urination. 
64. See id. at 1312-13. 
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school's requirement that a student have a signed consent form 
before they could volunteer to play sports did not put the school 
in the clear.6" 
The court then considered the amount of suspicion requisite 
for urinalysis. Schaill argued for an individualized standard of 
Go probable cause. The court, however, relied upon the balancing 
test used by the Supreme Court in previous cases.67 Since 
T.L.O. stated that the warrant's probable cause requirements 
were inapplicable68 and imposed a reasonableness test, the 
panel relied upon that standard and refused to narrow it, feel-
ing that a stringent Fourth Amendment analysis would "un-
necessarily intrude upon the purposes of the classroom or 
workplace. "6~) 
The court determined that there were many reasons why 
the school's urinalysis testing was reasonable. 7° First, the inva-
sion of privacy was diminished due to the fact that the students 
were not watched during their test. Second, there was a dimin-
ished expectation of privacy respecting urinalysis for athletes 
due to the "element of 'communal undress' inherent in athletic 
participation."71 Third, the student-athletes were subject to 
considerable regulation by the State High School Athletic Asso-
ciation, which, among other things, required "minimum grade, 
residency and eligibility requirements ... [as well as] training 
rules, including prohibitions on smoking, drinking and drug 
65. See id. 
66. See id. at 1313. 
67. See id. To determine whether the government may grant a search requires 
"balancfingl the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth 
Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to 
justify the intrusion." Id. (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)). 
68. Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1314. See also James M. McCray, Urine Trouble! Extend-
ing Constitutionality to Mandatory Suspicionless Drug Testing of Students in Extracur-
ricular Activities, 53 VAND. L. REV. 387 (arguing for the continuation and logical exten-
sion of recent decisions to include all students in public schools, and pointing out that 
schools still have an in parentis right). 
69. Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1314. The Supreme Court was concerned about requiring 
teachers to master the intricacies of Fourth Amendment requirements. Instead, the 
Court imposed upon teachers a duty to use the dictates of reason and common sense. 
Yet, it would seem odd to think that the Bill of Rights was open to one's personal judg-
ment, reason or common sense. This seems like a dubious standard through which one 
may, in fact, have no standards. 
70. The Schaill court seemed to be uncomfortable with legitimating this practice 
based solely on one factor. It went on discussing, ad nauseum, why drug testing is good 
and right, and even included many reasons not at issue. 
71. Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1318. 
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use both on and off school premises."72 The combination of 
these factors meant that "students competing for positions on 
an interscholastic athletic team would have strong expectations 
of privacy with respect to urine tests."n 
2. Extracurricular Activities and Driving 
Todd v. Rush County Schools (Todd/4 was the first Seventh 
Circuit case to specifically deal with the issue of random suspi-
cionless drug testing of students in extracurricular activities. 
Todd upheld the Supreme Court's rule in Vernonia, allowing a 
Rush County drug-testing plan for students who drive and par-
ticipate in extracurricular activities. The particular school 
drug-testing policy involved here required all students who de-
sired to participate in extracurricular activities or planned to 
obtain a parking permit to consent to random drug, alcohol, 
and tobacco testing. 75 The school district initiated the testing 
policy after the Indiana Prevention Resource Center indicated, 
based upon a survey of students at the high school, that to-
bacco, alcohol and marijuana use was higher than average for 
the various grades surveyed. 76 Due to the scope of the school 
district's new drug test, the policy virtually blanketed the en-
. h 1 77 tire sc oo . 
The Seventh Circuit relied upon the Vernonia test and 
Schaill to uphold the drug testing policy on in parentis or police 
72. !d. This seems to be a false argument. The nature of grade requirements and 
prohibition on the use of drugs and alcohol are one thing, using methods that violate a 
student's privacy right is another. At least one commentator has claimed that Vernonia 
and other decisions like Schaill permit suspicionless drug testing of all high school stu-
dents and that this behavior should be encouraged. See Bursch, supra note 50 (arguing 
that athletes have no need for additional protection from schools because other re-
quirements make it akin to a heavily regulated industry). 
73. Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1319. See also Russo & Gregory, supra note 1, at 619. 
The Seventh Circuit upheld the policy because: 
[I]t was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and that the district had suffi-
cient procedures in place that safeguarded the rights of students. In an interesting 
but realistic slant, the court also permitted testing based on its belief that since 
student-athletes gain enhanced prestige in the school community, it was not un-
reasonable to require student athletes and cheerleaders to undergo drug testing. 
[footnotes omitted]. 
74. 133 F.3d 984 (7"' Cir. 1998). 
75. See id at 984. 
76. See id at 985. 
77. See id. Of the 950 students who were in the high school, 170 did not partici-
pate in extracurricular activities. 
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power grounds. 7~ It underscored the responsibility a school dis-
trict has "as guardian and tutor of children entrusted to its 
care."
79 The court highlighted that the purpose of the drug test-
ing was to deter drug use and not to catch criminals. 80 Unlike 
previous cases, the court did not actually appear to weigh the 
reasonableness of Rush County's drug testing policy; rather, it 
based its decision on several general policy concerns. It held 
that participation in extracurricular activities was a student 
privilege and that drug testing was a cost for those who wished 
to volunteer to participate.81 Second, the circuit panel held that 
all extra-curricular activities were sufficiently similar to athlet-
ics and cheerleading as to render them under the same "special 
needs" category as athletes. 82 Third, irrespective of the student 
activity, the health and welfare rationale ultimately swayed 
the court: "the lynchpin of [the) drug testing program is to pro-
tect the health of the students involved."83 The court went fur-
ther, however, by holding that students should not complain 
about the drug testing because they benefit from the "enhanced 
prestige and status in the student community."84 In the end, 
the court decided that "if the schools are to survive and pros-
per, school administration must have reasonable means at 
their disposal to deter conduct which substantially disrupts the 
school environment."85 
Ill. ANALYSIS 
A Vernonia and Todd as applied in Joy v. Penn-Harris-
Madison School Corporation 
The Joy court relied heavily upon precedent in making its 
78. Sec id. at 986. 
79. !d. (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 665). 
80. Sec id. 
81. Sec id. 
il2. See id. 
83. !d. Some take a very generous view of this rationale. However, schools have 
only recently been responsible for the health and welfare for students (excepting on 
certain tort liability grounds). For a different view that is more generous to this line of 
thinking, see Russo & Gregory, supra note 1, at 623 ("since the board is responsible for 
the welfare of its students, it was justified in requiring drug testing of all participants 
in extracurricular activities."). 
84. Todd, 133 F.3d at 986 (quoting Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1320). 
85. !d. (quoting Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1324). 
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decision. It noted that under the Fourth Amendment, citizens 
are protected from "unreasonable searches and seizures by 
school officials."86 Urinalysis is a search, and normally the gov-
ernment must have probable cause and a warrant unless the 
search falls under the category of "special needs."87 At that 
point, the balancing test between governmental interests and 
the privacy interests of the parties would come into play. The 
court recognized that the nature of the school's concern was 
sufficiently similar to the concerns of schools in Vernonia and 
Todd. 88 Courts have emphasized that school districts are not 
allowed to divide students into general groupings on a cate-
gory-by-category basis.89 Consequently, the Joy court did not 
believe that Todd was mandated by Vernonia. g(t The court indi-
cated that, had Todd not been decided less than two years prior 
to Joy, "[it] would not sustain the random drug, alcohol, and 
nicotine testing of students seeking to participate in extracur-
ricular activities."91 
When the Joy court applied the Vernonia test, it made clear 
that Penn-Harris-Madison School Corporation (PHM) failed to 
meet the requirements for random suspicionless drug testing. 
Despite this, the court upheld the district's plan (except for the 
nicotine test) because of the precedent set in Todd. 
The Joy court first examined the nature of the privacy in-
terest of the students. It followed the assumption of previous 
courts that students expect less privacy than the general public 
because "students are in the temporary custody of the [s]chool" 
and are subject to routine physical exams and vaccinations. 92 
The court stated that, unlike the athletes in Vernonia and 
Todd, students who "participate in extracurricular activities or 
who drive to school do not subject themselves to more explicit 
and routine loss of bodily privacy as a necessary component of 
86. Joy, 212 F.3d at 1058 (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341-42). 
87. Id. 
88. See id. 
89. See id. at 1062. "The court cautioned against dividing students into broad 
categories and drug testing on a category-by-category basis because then 'all but the 
most withdrawn and uninvolved students [would] fall within a category that is subject 
to testing."' 
90. See id. 
91. Id. at 1063. Note 9 in the decision defines "extracurricular" to mean only "non-
athletic activities." 
92. Id. 
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their participating in the activities in question."93 Thus, as the 
court pointed out, students in extracurricular activities have 
higher expectations of privacy than athletes but less than the 
general public. 
The second Vernonia factor is examining the character of 
the intrusion. Since the drug test in Joy was virtually identical 
to the test promulgated in Vernonia, the intrusion was deemed 
not to be overly intrusive. 94 
The third factor examined is the nature of the governmen-
tal concern. The issue was "whether there is any correlation be-
tween the defined population and the abuse, and whether there 
is any correlation between the abuse and the government's in-
terest in protecting life and property."9 fi The difference between 
Vernonia, Todd, and Joy was that, in the first two cases, the 
schools presented evidence showing that drugs were a problem 
among the targeted students; whereas, the school Joy attended 
had not proved, "or even attempted to prove, that a correlation 
exists between drug use and those who engage in extracurricu-
lar activities or drug use and those who drive to school."96 The 
Court admonished the school district for dividing students into 
broad categories and then testing them based on those catego-
ries,97 a practice which schools had been previously warned 
against by the Seventh Circuit. 
The fourth Vernonia factor described the correlation be-
tween the alleged abuses and the governmental interest. While 
statistics provided by PHM indicated that drug usage by stu-
dents was generally higher than normal, the school district did 
not explain how students involved in extra-curricular activities 
were any different in their ability to perform than other stu-
dents.98 PHM also failed to show that students who were in-
93. Id. 
Although PHM students in extracurricular activities, other than 
athletics, also volunteer to join a particular group and to subject 
themselves to the rules of that organization, those rules do not re-
quire the same surrender of physical privacy as required of the stu-
dent athletes in Vernonia. In the case of students driving to school, 
the contrast is even more stark. Id. 
94. See id. at 1064. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. See id. The goal in this area of the law is that all students will eventually be-
come subject to random drug testing in order to attend public schools, as was admitted 
by the school district's attorney. 
98. See id. 
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valved in extra-curricular activities were in more danger than 
other students. With regards to students who drove to school, 
the court found it plausible that "a legitimate and pressing 
need for drug and alcohol testing of students driving vehicles 
on school property stems from the ability of one student under 
the influence of drugs or alcohol to injure seriously another 
student."99 The court, however, found that the school district 
had failed to provide evidence that showed "a correlation be-
tween drug use and students in extracurricular activities, or 
other evidence of a particularized special need, before imple-
menting its suspicionless drug testing policy for those particu-
Ioo lar student groups." 
The final factor the court examined was the efficacy of the 
means. In both Vernonia, and Todd, the courts held that ran-
dom suspicionless drug testing was appropriate because it was 
"difficult to use individualized suspicion to drug test a broad 
population of students, such as athletes."101 The Joy court em-
phasized that other cases have held that schools should use a 
suspicion based regime of drug testing where there is no evi-102 dence of a drug problem by the targeted group. The court 
said that there was no evidence to correlate drug usage and 
student extracurricular activities and student drivers: "PHM 
has made no showing that teachers, staff and sponsors of ex-
tracurricular activities would not be able to observe the stu-
dents for suspicious behavior."10:1 Thus, PHM failed this prong 
as well. 
Based upon the factors outlined by the Supreme Court in 
Vernonia, the circuit court held that PHM failed to properly 
justif~ its random drug-testing plan for extra-curricular activi-
ties.1 4 Despite this sentiment, the court upheld the decision 
99. /d. 
100. Jd. at 1065. 
101. /d. 
102. See id. "In Chandler, however, the Court stressed that suspicionless drug test-
ing without evidence of a drug problem by the targeted group should not be used if 
suspicion-based drug testing is possible." (citing Chandler u. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 
(1997)). 
103. Joy, 212 F.3d at 1065. 
104. See id. "With respect to random testing of those who participate in extracur-
ricular activities, we believe that according to the methodology employed by the Su-
preme Court in Vernonia, there has been inadequate showing that such an intrusion is 
justified." Also, "[T]he judges of this panel believe that students involved in extracur-
ricular activities should not be subject to random, suspicionless drug testing as a condi-
tion of participation in the activity." /d. at 1066. 
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upon precedent established in Todd: "we believe that we must 
adhere to the holding in Todd and affirm the district court's 
grant of summary judgment for the School as it relates to test-
ing students involved in extracurricular activities."105 The court 
warned counsel not to take this too far, however, and expressed 
fears that schools were moving down a slippery slope in which 
all students would eventually be randomly drug tested. 
B. Social Policy: Implications following Joy 
Although much has been written over the past few years ei-
ther supporting or decrying the use of suspicionless drug test-
ing for students, little ink has been spent examining the under-
lying policy factors given by courts for their decisions. It is 
fairly clear that courts have relied on two primary social policy 
justifications for their decisions. Since the following section of 
this paper attempts to outline principles that a school board 
should use in determining whether or not to engage in random 
drug testing, this section will first examine what social as-
sumptions our society is buying into in order to sacrifice stu-
dent Fourth Amendment rights. 
The first is the police power justification, which states that 
"[b]ecause school-aged children are obligated to attend school, 
the nation's school districts assume a duty to protect them 
while at school."106 As phrased by one author, "[p]ublic school 
students should feel and be safe at school. They should be free 
from violence by other students as well as from unreasonable 
invasions of privacy and regulations of individuality by school 
officials. The current state of constitutional law as applied in 
the school setting, however, seems to require one at the ex-
pense of the other."107 With their expanded role as protectors 
and enforcers, school districts risk public disapproval or outcrls 
when they fail to successfully address student drug problems. 1 8 
105. !d. at 1066. 
106. Jennifer L. Barnes, Comment, Students Under Seige? Constitutional Consid-
erations for Public Schools Concerned with School Safety, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 621, 631 
(2000). 
107. !d. at 645. 
108. See Michelle A. Bernstein, Comment, Constitutional Law-Massachusetts 
Does Not Guarantee Fundamental Right to Education-Doe v. Superintendent of 
Schools, 421 Mass. ll7, 653 N.E.2d 1088 (1995), 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 257, 259-60 
(1996) ("The courts have reasoned that, in most situations, a school's safety and disci-
pline needs largely outweigh a student's individual right to education, thus suggesting 
that pedagogical concerns qualify a student's right to attend school."). 
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T.L. 0. first announced that the Fourth Amendment applied to 
school officials, 109 and the expansion of the Vernonia standard 
to include students in extracurricular activities as outlined in 
Todd and Joy indicate that these limits do not have much 
meaning. 
With the advent of suspicionless random drug testing, soci-
ety has expanded the police power given to schools. This is dif-
ferent from the ability to suspend or evict students from school 
grounds. The ability to give drug tests has heretofore been re-
served for more formal enforcement structures in an environ-
ment of more significantly diminished constitutional rights. no 
This is a significant enhancement of the school district's role, 
power and responsibility, and carries with it the implicit threat 
of even further encroachment upon students' constitutional 
rights. 
Another underlying social justification is the desire to pro-
mote the health and welfare of public school students. All cases 
aforementioned used this as grounds for upholding the drug 
testing policy. This justification is extraneous to schools' re-
sponsibility to educate, and has consequently not been argued 
as a tool to avoid school district tort liability. This justification, 
instead, raises the idea that schools are attempting to provide 
more holistic services and to be an environment where children 
are molded into upstanding adults. This is a situation where 
modern social science comes into conflict with the law. It is be-
lieved that with the correct curriculum, the right incentive 
packages, and the right amount of funding, school districts can 
stitch up holes in other areas of students' social fabric. 
As a result, schools take on the responsibility to provide 
meals, before school activities, after school activities, and eve-
rything in between to help students "make it." The question 
that needs to be asked is, "what are the limits of a state spon-
sored educational process?"m For already overburdened 
schools, at some point something simply has to give. From a 
policy perspective, it appears that in order for a school to func-
tion properly it must limit its primary responsibility to teach-
ing instead of attempting to take on a full social services role. 
109. See also Jensen, supra note 35. 
110. I.e., a probation officer may use random suspicionless drug testing as an ap-
propriate tool for drug offenders. 
111. See Berstein, supra note 108, at 263 (discussing a recent Massachusetts case 
which holds that there is no fundamental right to an education). 
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In the end, schools must take on and clean up all of society's 
ills, almost none of which they are responsible for. Schools have 
become ground zero for resolving issues adults do not want to 
deal with. When should we ask, "what is the purpose of public 
education for my child?," "what role does and should my child's 
school play in my child's social and cognitive development?," 
"what activities are most important for a child to participate in 
when they attend elementary school, junior high and high 
school?" Parents must answer these questions, as should (on a 
modified basis) school board superintendents, principals, and 
school boards. Teachers must examine their purpose for being 
teachers. 
The biggest question society should begin asking is this: 
when are the marginal costs for administering a certain pro-
gram in the public schools outweighed by the marginal bene-
fits? Or more specifically, what largess currently allocated to 
school activities is better suited to other governmental or pri-
vate interests within the local community? While some argue 
that public schools themselves should be dramatically altered, 
perhaps the real problem is merely that schools have lost focus 
on their primary goal: to educate youn~ people in a discrete set 
of skills in preparation for adulthood. 11 
If school districts feel that in order to provide a satisfactory 
extra-curricular program they need to resort to random drug 
testing, perhaps the time has come for a shift in policy. Instead 
of remaining more concerned about school-provided extracur-
ricular activities, they should focus their energies on whether 
their students can read, write, or do arithmetic. Perhaps local 
governments and school districts could formulate plans to shift 
the burden of extracurricular activities from the schoolhouse to 
a broader public sphere. 113 
IV. WHAT Is A SCHOOL DISTRICT TO Do? 
Many school districts are concerned about the level of drugs 
112. One could easily argue that schools do just that today. The problem is that 
public schools should only play one part in a student's life. Other skill sets are learned 
in the home, through interaction with other facets of government, and in church and 
non-school related extracurricular activities. 
113. Schools could also spin off athletic programs, turning them over to city or pri-
vate leagues. Schools, meanwhile, could use the money they save on classroom materi-
als, teacher salaries, or even to retire school bonds early. 
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and their ability to help prevent students from harming them-
selves with drugs; consequently, the following ~uiding princi-
ples may help school districts formulate a plan. 11 
First, conduct an assessment. Determine whether there 
really is a drug problem in the school district. This may help 
school districts determine what sorts of remedies are necessary 
for their own individual situations. Use a survey or other scien-
tific means to discover what percentages of students in the 
school district are using drugs and the type of drugs that are 
being used. Attempt to determine whether a correlation exists 
between levels of drug usage and the types of activities stu-
dents are participating in. During the assessment, make sure 
that the five Vernonia factors are appropriately answered: 
• What is the nature of the privacy interest? 
• What will be the character of the intrusion? 
• What is the nature of the government's concern? 
• What is the immediacy of the government's concern? 
• What is the efficacy of the means? 
Second, during the period where an assessment is being 
made, use what courts normally describe as "less intrusive 
means" to fight the drug problem by providing seminars, re-
quired workshops, classes, videos, and other sorts of training to 
warn students and their parents from using drugs and alcohol. 
See what effect this has on the level of drug usage in the 
school, or in the school district. Develop a file of anecdotal ma-
terial and stories where students became involved with drugs 
and the tragedies that befell them. 
Third, if random drug testing is determined to be necessary, 
focus on the group of students who are most "at risk" of damag-
ing their health and welfare. Have a meeting with the parents 
of the students and, prior to implementation of the policy, re-
ceive their input and suggestions. Parents seem to be con-
cerned about the safety of their children and frequently go 
along with good faith efforts of schools to help children. 
The following factors should be considered when developing 
a plan: 
114. This should be taken as a specific plan. This section's purpose is to highlight 
the underlying considerations that should go into the determination of how to proceed 
with developing a plan. Two law review articles that offer excellent nuts and bolts spe-
cifics on planning procedures are: Bursch, supra note 50 (providing a model resolution 
for a school drug testing policy) and Russo & Gregory, supra note 1. Also consider Jus-
tice O'Connor's dissent in Vernonia. 
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• Narrowly tailor the number or type of students you are 
drug testing (i.e. athletes and cheerleaders). 
• Have both students and parents sign permission forms. 
• Regulate substances that will easily pass muster like il-
legal drugs and alcohol. 
• Ensure that there is a legitimate written procedure for 
who is selected, how they are tested, and how the re-
sults for positive drug tests will be handled. 
• Try to work with established services that have already 
done this sort of thing so as to create an air of objectiv-
ity and a scientific basis for the project. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In spite of the dangers and harms faced by students who 
use drugs, it is possible for school districts to utilize means that 
rely upon a suspicion-based level rather than merely resorting 
to random suspicionless drug testing. Certainly, situations may 
exist where it appears that the most drastic means possible are 
necessary to combat this problem. It should be remembered, 
though, that students are also people who have constitutional 
rights that the government may not violate. 
Jon Eskelsen 
